Cognition does not affect perception

Pour rencontrer Chaz Firestone, merci de contacter Brent Strickland : stricklandbrent@gmail.com.

What determines what we see? A tidal wave of recent research alleges that visual experience is 'penetrated' by higher-level cognitive states such as beliefs, desires, emotions, intentions, and linguistic abilities. There is a growing consensus that such effects are ubiquitous, and even that the distinction between seeing and thinking may itself be unsustainable. I argue otherwise: There is in fact no

La cognition. Du neurone à la société

Après une brève présentation de l’ouvrage, une première partie sera consacrée à une table-ronde réunissant des responsables de formation en sciences cognitives de différents centres en France; une seconde partie à trois types d’interfaces: entre disciplines constitutives du champ (Pierre Jacob), avec l’industrie (Guillaume Thibault), avec les politiques publiques (Mariam Chammat).

The smart System 1: Towards a dual process theory 2.0

The two-headed, dual process view of human thinking has been very influential in the cognitive sciences. The core idea that thinking can be conceived as an interplay between a fast-intuitive and slower-deliberate process has inspired a wide range of psychologists, philosophers, and economists. However, despite the popularity of the dual process framework it faces multiple challenges. One key issue is that the precise interaction between intuitive and deliberate thought processes (or System 1 and 2, as they are often referred to) is not well understood.